

A note on Goodman's theorem

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Abstract

Goodman's theorem states that intuitionistic arithmetic in all finite types plus full choice, $\mathbf{HA}^\omega + \mathbf{AC}$, is conservative over first-order intuitionistic arithmetic \mathbf{HA} . We show that this result does not extend to various subsystems of \mathbf{HA}^ω , \mathbf{HA} with restricted induction.

1 Introduction

Let $\mathbf{E-HA}^\omega$ denote the system of extensional intuitionistic arithmetic and \mathbf{HA}^ω its 'neutral' variant as defined in [10].¹ $\mathbf{E-PA}^\omega$ and \mathbf{PA}^ω are the corresponding theories with classical logic. \mathbf{PA} (resp. \mathbf{HA}) is first-order Peano arithmetic (resp. its intuitionistic version) with all primitive recursive functions. \mathbf{T} denotes the set of finite types.

The schema \mathbf{AC} of full choice is given by $\bigcup_{\rho, \tau \in \mathbf{T}} \mathbf{AC}^{\rho, \tau}$, where

$$\mathbf{AC}^{\rho, \tau} : \forall x^\rho \exists y^\tau A(x, y) \rightarrow \exists Y^{\tau(\rho)} \forall x^\rho A(x, Yx)$$

and A is an arbitrary formula of $\mathcal{L}(\mathbf{HA}^\omega)$.

We also consider a restricted (arithmetical) form of \mathbf{AC} :

$$\mathbf{AC}_{ar}^{0,0} : \forall x^0 \exists y^0 A(x, y) \rightarrow \exists f^{0(0)} \forall x^0 A(x, fx),$$

where A contains only quantifiers of type 0 (but maybe parameters of arbitrary type).

By the rule of choice we mean

$$\mathbf{ACR} : \frac{\forall x^\rho \exists y^\tau A(x, y)}{\exists Y^{\tau(\rho)} \forall x^\rho A(x, Yx)}$$

¹Note that both theories contain only equality of type 0 as a primitive relation symbol.

for all ρ, τ and all formulas A of $\mathcal{L}(\mathbf{HA}^\omega)$.

Classically we have the following well-known situation:

$$(\mathbf{E-})\mathbf{PA}^\omega + \mathbf{AC} = (\mathbf{E-})\mathbf{PA}^\omega + \mathbf{ACR}$$

has the strength of full simple type theory.²

Furthermore, even $\mathbf{PA}^\omega + \mathbf{AC}_{ar}^{0,0}$ is not Π_1^0 -conservative over \mathbf{PA}^ω : $\mathbf{PA}^\omega + \mathbf{AC}_{ar}^{0,0}$ proves the consistency of Peano arithmetic³ whereas \mathbf{PA}^ω is conservative over \mathbf{PA} .

These facts are in sharp contrast to the intuitionistic case where – in particular – the following is known:

- 1) $(\mathbf{E-})\mathbf{HA}^\omega$ is closed under \mathbf{ACR} .
- 2) $(\mathbf{E-})\mathbf{HA}^\omega + \mathbf{AC}$ is conservative over $(\mathbf{E-})\mathbf{HA}^\omega$ for all formulas A which are implied (relative to $(\mathbf{E-})\mathbf{HA}^\omega$) by their modified-realizability interpretation.
- 3) $\mathbf{E-HA}^\omega + \mathbf{AC}$ is conservative over \mathbf{HA} .⁴

1) and 2) are proved e.g. in [10],[11] using the ‘modified-realizability-with-truth’ resp. the ‘modified-realizability’ interpretation.

3) for \mathbf{HA}^ω instead of $\mathbf{E-HA}^\omega$ is due to [4],[5] (a different proof is given in [7]). The generalization to $\mathbf{E-HA}^\omega$ was established by Beeson in [1],[2] (using [6] and solving a problem stated by H. Friedman) who refers to 3) for \mathbf{HA}^ω as ‘Goodman’s theorem’ (see also [9] for an even stronger result).

Let us switch now to the subsystems, $(\mathbf{E-})\mathbf{PA}_\perp^\omega$, $(\mathbf{E-})\mathbf{HA}_\perp^\omega$ of $(\mathbf{E-})\mathbf{PA}^\omega$, $(\mathbf{E-})\mathbf{HA}^\omega$ where the full schema of induction is replaced by the schema of quantifier-free induction

$$\mathbf{QF-IA} : A_0(0) \wedge \forall x^0 (A_0(x) \rightarrow A_0(x')) \rightarrow \forall x^0 A_0(x),$$

where A_0 is a quantifier-free formula, and instead of the constants of $(\mathbf{E-})\mathbf{HA}^\omega$ we only have 0^0 and symbols for every primitive recursive function plus their defining equations (but no higher type functional constants). If we add to $(\mathbf{E-})\mathbf{PA}_\perp^\omega$, $(\mathbf{E-})\mathbf{HA}_\perp^\omega$ the combinators $\Pi_{\rho,\tau}$ and $\Sigma_{\delta,\rho,\tau}$ (from \mathbf{HA}^ω) as well as the predicative Kleene recursors \widehat{R}_ρ (and – in the case of \mathbf{HA}_\perp^ω – also a functional allowing definition by cases which is redundant in $\mathbf{E-HA}_\perp^\omega$) we obtain the systems, $(\mathbf{E-})\widehat{\mathbf{PA}}_\perp^\omega$, $(\mathbf{E-})\widehat{\mathbf{HA}}_\perp^\omega$ due to Feferman (see [3]).

\mathbf{PA}_\perp , \mathbf{HA}_\perp are the restrictions of \mathbf{PA} , \mathbf{HA} with quantifier-free induction only.

Since both the modified-realizability interpretation with and without truth hold for $(\mathbf{E-})\widehat{\mathbf{HA}}_\perp^\omega$ one easily obtains the results 1),2) above also for this restricted system. In this note we observe that 3) fails for $\widehat{\mathbf{HA}}_\perp^\omega$ (and even for \mathbf{HA}_\perp^ω) and \mathbf{HA}_\perp instead of $(\mathbf{E-})\mathbf{HA}^\omega$ and \mathbf{HA} .

²Every instance of \mathbf{AC} is derivable in $\mathbf{PA}^\omega + \mathbf{ACR}$ and \mathbf{ACR} is a derivable rule in $(\mathbf{E-})\mathbf{PA}^\omega + \mathbf{AC}$.

³ $\mathbf{PA}^\omega + \mathbf{AC}_{ar}^{0,0}$ proves the schema of arithmetical comprehension (with arbitrary parameters) and therefore is a finite type extension of (a function variable version of) the second-order system $(\Pi_\infty^0\text{-CA})$ which is known to prove the consistency of \mathbf{PA} (see e.g. [3](5.5.2)).

⁴ \mathbf{HA} can be considered as a subsystem of $\mathbf{E-HA}^\omega$ either by switching to a definitorial extension of $\mathbf{E-HA}^\omega$ by adding all primitive recursive functions or modulo a suitable bi-unique mapping Δ which translates \mathbf{HA} into a subsystem of $\mathbf{E-HA}^\omega$, see [10] (1.6.9) for the latter.

2 Results

Proposition 1 *Let $A \in \mathcal{L}(\mathbf{PA})$ be such that $\mathbf{PA} \vdash A$. Then one can construct a sentence $\tilde{A} \in \mathcal{L}(\mathbf{PA})$ such that $A \leftrightarrow \tilde{A}$ holds by **classical** logic and $\mathbf{HA}_-^\omega \upharpoonright + \mathbf{AC}_{ar}^{0,0} \vdash \tilde{A}$.*

Proof:

Let A be such that $\mathbf{PA} \vdash A$. By negative translation ($F \rightsquigarrow F'$) it follows that $\mathbf{HA} \vdash A'$. So there exists a finite set G_1, \dots, G_k of instances of the schema of induction **IA** in \mathbf{HA} (more precisely G_i is the universal closure of the corresponding instance) such that

$$\mathbf{HA} \upharpoonright \vdash \bigwedge_{i=1}^k G_i \rightarrow A'.$$

Let $\widehat{G}_i(x, \underline{a})$ be the induction formula belonging to G_i (x being the induction variable and \underline{a} the (number) parameters of the induction formula), i.e.

$$G_i \equiv \forall \underline{a} (\widehat{G}_i(0, \underline{a}) \wedge \forall x (\widehat{G}_i(x, \underline{a}) \rightarrow \widehat{G}_i(x', \underline{a})) \rightarrow \forall x \widehat{G}_i(x, \underline{a})).$$

Define

$$\check{G}_i := \forall x, \underline{a} \exists y (y =_0 0 \leftrightarrow \widehat{G}_i(x, \underline{a}))$$

and consider the formula

$$\tilde{A} := \bigwedge_{i=1}^k \check{G}_i \rightarrow A'.$$

With **classical** logic (and $0 \neq S0$) we have $\tilde{A} \leftrightarrow A' \leftrightarrow A$.

Using $\mathbf{AC}_{ar}^{0,0}$ applied to \check{G}_i one shows

$$\mathbf{HA}_-^\omega \upharpoonright + \mathbf{AC}_{ar}^{0,0} \vdash \check{G}_i \rightarrow \exists f \forall x, \underline{a} (fx\underline{a} =_0 0 \leftrightarrow \widehat{G}_i(x, \underline{a})).$$

QF-IA applied to $A_0(x) := (fx\underline{a} =_0 0)$ now yields G_i . Hence

$$\mathbf{HA}_-^\omega \upharpoonright + \mathbf{AC}_{ar}^{0,0} \vdash \bigwedge_{i=1}^k \check{G}_i \rightarrow \bigwedge_{i=1}^k G_i$$

and therefore

$$\mathbf{HA}_-^\omega \upharpoonright + \mathbf{AC}_{ar}^{0,0} \vdash \bigwedge_{i=1}^k \check{G}_i \rightarrow A'.$$

Hence \tilde{A} satisfies the claim of the proposition.

Corollary 2 *For every $n \in \mathbb{N}$ one can construct a sentence $A \in \mathcal{L}(\mathbf{HA} \upharpoonright)$ (involving only $0, S, +, \cdot$ and logic) such that*

$$\mathbf{HA}_-^\omega \upharpoonright + \mathbf{AC}_{ar}^{0,0} \vdash A, \text{ but } \mathbf{PA} \upharpoonright + \Sigma_n^0\text{-IA} \not\vdash A.$$

Proof:

It is well-known (see e.g. [8]) that for every $n \in \mathbb{N}$ there exists an arithmetical sentence \tilde{A} (involving only $0, S, +, \cdot$ and logic) such that $\mathbf{PA} \vdash \tilde{A}$ (and even $\mathbf{PA} \upharpoonright + \Sigma_{n+1}^0\text{-IA} \vdash \tilde{A}$), but $\mathbf{PA} \upharpoonright + \Sigma_n^0\text{-IA} \not\vdash \tilde{A}$. The corollary now follows from the proposition above.

Corollary 3 $(\mathbf{E-})\mathbf{HA}_-^\omega \upharpoonright + \mathbf{AC}_{ar}^{0,0}$ is not conservative over $\mathbf{HA} \upharpoonright$. In particular, Goodman's theorem fails for $\mathbf{HA}_-^\omega \upharpoonright$, $\mathbf{HA} \upharpoonright$ and therefore also for $\widehat{\mathbf{HA}}^\omega \upharpoonright$, $\mathbf{HA} \upharpoonright$.

For $\widehat{\mathbf{HA}}^\omega \upharpoonright$ instead of $\mathbf{HA}_-^\omega \upharpoonright$ and without the restriction to the language $\{0, S, +, \cdot\}$ but with $A \in \mathcal{L}(\mathbf{HA} \upharpoonright)$, the proof of proposition 1 is even more easy:

It is well-known (see [8]) that for every $n \in \mathbb{N}$ there is an instance

$$\tilde{A} := (\forall x < a \exists y A(x, y) \rightarrow \exists y_0 \forall x < a \exists y < y_0 A(x, y)),$$

where $A \in \Pi_n^0$, of the so-called 'collection principle for Π_n^0 -formulas' $\Pi_n^0\text{-CP}$ (A containing only number parameters) such that

$$\mathbf{PA} \upharpoonright + \Sigma_n^0\text{-IA} \not\vdash \tilde{A}.$$

However $\widehat{\mathbf{HA}}^\omega \upharpoonright + \mathbf{AC}_{ar}^{0,0} \vdash \tilde{A}$:

$\mathbf{AC}_{ar}^{0,0}$ applied to $\forall x \exists y (x < a \rightarrow A(x, y))$ yields a function f such that $\forall x < a A(x, f x)$. Applying the functional $\Phi_{\max} f x = \max(f 0, \dots, f x)$ (definable in $\widehat{\mathbf{HA}}^\omega \upharpoonright$) to f and $a \div 1$ yields a y_0 such that $\forall x < a \exists y < y_0 A(x, y)$: Put $y_0 := \Phi_{\max}(f, a \div 1) + 1$.

So in particular for $n = 0$ we have a universally closed instance

$$\tilde{A} := \forall a, \underline{b} ((\forall x < a \exists y A_0(x, y, a, \underline{b}) \rightarrow \exists y_0 \forall x < a \exists y < y_0 A_0(x, y, a, \underline{b})),$$

of $\Pi_0^0\text{-CP}$ (where A_0 is quantifier-free and $a^0, \underline{b}^0, x^0, y^0$ are all the free variables of $A_0(x, y, a, \underline{b})$) such that $\mathbf{PA} \upharpoonright \not\vdash \tilde{A}$. Using coding of pairs and bounded search (both available in $\mathbf{PA} \upharpoonright$), \tilde{A} can be expressed as a sentence having the form

$$\forall a^0 (\forall x^0 \exists y^0 A_0(x, y, a) \rightarrow \exists y^0 B_0(y, a)),$$

where A_0 and B_0 both are quantifier-free. Furthermore the instance of $\mathbf{AC}_{ar}^{0,0}$ needed to prove \tilde{A} in $\widehat{\mathbf{HA}}^\omega \upharpoonright + \mathbf{AC}_{ar}^{0,0}$ is

$$\forall a^0 (\forall x^0 \exists y^0 A_0(x, y, a) \rightarrow \exists f \forall x A_0(x, f x, a)).$$

So we have the following

Proposition 4 One can construct a sentence $A := \forall a^0 (\forall x^0 \exists y^0 A_0(x, y, a) \rightarrow \exists y^0 B_0(y, a))$ (A_0, B_0 being quantifier-free formulas of $\mathbf{HA} \upharpoonright$) such that

$$\widehat{\mathbf{HA}}^\omega \upharpoonright + \mathbf{AC}_-^{0,0}\text{-qf} \vdash A, \text{ but } \mathbf{PA} \upharpoonright \not\vdash A,$$

where $\mathbf{AC}_-^{0,0}\text{-qf}$ is the restriction of $\mathbf{AC}_{ar}^{0,0}$ to quantifier-free formulas without function parameters.

Remark 5 Note that modified-realizability interpretation yields that $\widehat{\mathbf{HA}}^\omega \Vdash \mathbf{AC}$ is conservative over \mathbf{HA}^ω w.r.t. sentences having e.g. the form $A := \forall a^0 (\exists x^0 \forall y^0 A_0(x, y, a) \rightarrow \exists y^0 B_0(y, a))$.

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